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CASE SUMMARY

UNITED STATES v. NOSAL:
SEPARATING VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYERS’ COMPUTER-USE
POLICIES FROM CRIMINAL
COMPUTER HACKING INVASIONS

COLETTE THOMASON*
INTRODUCTION
Computer crimes are a worldwide threat. 1 Any individual with
access to a computer may become victim to a computer crime. In the
summer of 2010, the Pentagon alone received over six million hacking
and security threats per day, or 250,000 an hour. 2 One of many
measures to prevent computer crimes is the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA), a federal statute that prohibits the unauthorized access of a

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California; B.A., Business Administration, 2005, University of Hawaii at Hilo.
1
See University Professor Helps FBI Crack $70 Million Cybercrime Ring, ROCK CENTER
WITH BRIAN WILLIAMS, (Mar. 21, 2012, 12:14 PM), www.rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/
2012/03/21/10792287-university-professor-helps-fbi-crack-70-million-cybercrime-ring
(reporting
that hackers from Eastern Europe allegedly stole $70 million from the payroll accounts of
approximately 400 companies in America); see also Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Six
Hackers in the United States and Abroad Charged for Crimes Affecting over One Million Victims,
(Mar. 6, 2012), www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/six-hackers-in-the-united-states-andabroad-charged-for-crimes-affecting-over-one-million-victims (reporting that hackers were charged
with theft of confidential information from approximately 860,000 subscribers of Stratfor, a private
geopolitical analysis firm, and that hackers had claimed responsibility for halting service to websites
for Visa, MasterCard, and Paypal in early 2011, in retaliation for the payment companies refusing to
accept donations to Wikileaks).
2
Governments Battle To Stay Ahead of Threats on Internet, “The Great Leveler,” PBS
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 10, 2010), www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/july-dec10/cybersec_08-10.html.
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computer or computer data, such as when a hacker obtains bank account
information from a financial institution’s network. 3 There is currently
disagreement among appellate courts as to the scope and application of
the CFAA. 4 Some circuits apply the CFAA only to hacking crimes,
while others include violations of a webpage’s terms of service or an
employer’s computer-use policy. 5
A violation of an employer’s computer-use policy could be as minor
as checking a personal Facebook page or personal bank account while at
work. On the other hand, the violation of an employer’s computer-use
policy could be more egregious, as in the case of United States v. Nosal. 6
In Nosal, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit examined the scope of the
CFAA as applied to an employee who used a work computer for personal
purposes, addressing the issue of whether a violation of an employer’s
computer-use policy can be considered criminal hacking. 7
I.

BACKGROUND

The CFAA was enacted by Congress in 1984 8 and provides both
criminal and civil penalties for unauthorized access to a computer. 9 The
CFAA prohibits intentional and unauthorized access to a computer that
results in the accesser obtaining information from any protected
computer. 10 Under the CFAA, “protected computers” include those used
exclusively for the use of financial institutions or the federal government,
as well as those used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication. 11
3

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (Westlaw 2012).
Peter A. Crusco, The “‘Privatization’ of Criminal Prosecution and the CFAA,” LAW
TECHNOLOGY NEWS (June 20, 2012), www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?
id=1339937415222.
5
Id.
6
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
7
Id. at 856 (stating that hacking is “the circumvention of technological access barriers”).
Because of its size, the Ninth Circuit ordinarily uses a limited en banc court, consisting of the Chief
Judge of the circuit plus ten additional judges drawn by lot from the pool of active judges. Rarely, a
case heard by a limited en banc court may be reheard by the full court. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3; see also
28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (Westlaw 2012); Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (authorizing
limited en banc courts for courts of appeals having more than fifteen active judges). Nosal was
decided by a limited en banc court. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 855.
8
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858.
9
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (Westlaw 2012).
10
Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A)-(C). Besides information received from “any protected computer,” the
CFAA also prohibits obtaining information in a financial record of a financial institution,
information on a consumer in a consumer reporting agency’s file, and information from any
department or agency of the federal government. Id. For simplicity, this Case Summary focuses on
the prohibition relating to obtaining information from “any protected computer.”
11
Id. § 1030(e)(2).
4
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The purpose of the CFAA is to prevent increasingly prevalent
computer hacks. 12 The CFAA punishes whoever “knowingly and with
intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the
intended fraud and obtains anything of value.” 13 Therefore, the CFAA
may be violated in two ways: either by accessing a computer without any
authorization, or by having authorization for limited access and
exceeding that authorized access. 14 The phrase “exceeds authorized
access” is defined as “to access a computer with authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” 15
The CFAA has been used by prosecutors in a variety of cases
relating to the unauthorized use of computer data. 16 Unauthorized use
commonly involves accessing a competitor’s or former employer’s
database to obtain trade secrets, in order to cause damage to the
competitor or former employer. 17 Nosal involved a former employee
who obtained his former employer’s confidential customer information
from former colleagues still employed with the company. 18 Other cases
have involved charges under the CFAA pertaining to violations of
websites’ terms of service agreements. 19
A CFAA violation was alleged in a well-known federal criminal
case involving the suicide of a teenage girl who was harassed on a social
networking site by a classmate’s mother. 20 Lori Drew was charged with
violating the CFAA after allegedly “cyberbullying” thirteen-year-old
Megan Meier, her teenage daughter’s former friend. 21 Drew created a

12

Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4).
14
Id. § 1030(a)(4); see Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
15
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6).
16
See JONATHAN D. AVILA ET AL., PRIVACY COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION IN CALIFORNIA
§ 4.21 (2008).
17
See id.
18
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
19
See supra note 16.
20
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Not all allegations in the
indictment were established at trial.
21
Id. at 452. Lori Drew was charged with violating the portion of the CFAA that prohibits
“accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining information
from a protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or foreign communication and
the offense is committed in furtherance of a crime or tortious act.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2)(C), (c)(2)(B)(ii)). For example, Lori Drew used a photograph of a boy as the fictitious
account’s profile photo without the boy’s consent, in violation of MySpace’s terms of service. See
id. at 452.
13
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fictitious profile on the website www.MySpace.com (“MySpace”), 22
posing as a sixteen-year-old boy, and used the page to contact Meier. 23
After
The prosecution described the contact as “flirtatious.” 24
approximately a month of flirtatious contact, the fictitious “boy”
reportedly sent Meier a message that he no longer liked her and that “the
world would be a better place without her in it.” 25 Megan Meier
committed suicide that same day. 26 A jury convicted Lori Drew of a
misdemeanor violation of the CFAA because she intentionally breached
MySpace’s terms of service. 27
The jury’s guilty verdict was
subsequently vacated by the federal district court. 28 The district court
found that the conviction violated the void-for-vagueness doctrine
because users of MySpace were not on notice that a breach of the
website’s terms of service could be a crime. 29
A CFAA violation can also be alleged as a civil cause of action. 30
For example, an employer initiated litigation against a former employee
who installed damaging software on a company computer. 31 The
employee decided to leave the company and start his own competing
business and installed the software before returning the computer back to
the company. 32 The software destroyed data on the employer’s computer

22

Id. at 453. In Drew, a vice president of MySpace described MySpace as “a ‘social
networking’ website where members can create ‘profiles’ and interact with other members.” Id.
MySpace accounts are free of charge, but members must be of a certain age, must provide personal
information, such as their name and email address, and must agree to MySpace’s terms of service
and privacy policy. Id. It is not required that an individual read or even access the terms of service
and privacy policy; all that is needed is a click on the “check box” stating that the individual agrees
to the terms of service and privacy policy. Id.
23
Id. at 452.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 451.
28
Id.
29
See id. at 463 (explaining that “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement”) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)). As for the breach of a
website’s terms of service, the CFAA does not explicitly treat such a breach as a criminal act, and, as
such, there were no clear guidelines for legal enforcement. See id. at 466-67. In the absence of clear
guidelines as to when the intentional violation of a website’s terms of service could lead to criminal
penalties, the CFAA would be overbroad. Id. An extremely high number of Internet users could be
turned into criminals, including not only those who create false MySpace accounts, but those who,
for example, lie about their appearance or advertise the sale of girl scout cookies on MySpace. See
id. at 466.
30
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (Westlaw 2012).
31
Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
32
Id. at 419.
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and permanently erased company information. 33 The Seventh Circuit
held that the installation could violate the CFAA, and remanded the case
for a determination by the trial court. 34
In a similar instance, the First Circuit heard a case that involved a
tour company that sued a competitor, alleging a CFAA violation. 35
Several employees of the competitor were former employees of the tour
company. 36 The competitor used a software program that could access
the tour company’s prices from the company’s website. 37 The defendant
competitor created the software program based on its employees’
knowledge of the tour company’s proprietary codes. 38 The competitor
then used the pricing information to undercut the tour company’s
prices. 39 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s grant of an
injunction, based on the CFAA, that barred the competitor from using the
software program. 40
A. FACTS OF UNITED STATES V. NOSAL
Defendant David Nosal was a former employee of Korn/Ferry
International, a firm that provided services from executive recruitment to
talent consulting and leadership development. 41 After Nosal left the
company, he contacted several former coworkers who were still
employed at Korn/Ferry and persuaded them to release confidential
information to him. 42 Nosal planned to use the information to create his
own competing business. 43 The information he obtained from his former
co-workers included source lists, names and contact information for
Korn/Ferry clients. 44
Korn/Ferry’s computer-use policy authorized employees to access
such information, but employees were not authorized to release

33

Id.
Id. at 420. Since the appeal stemmed from the dismissal of the employer’s suit, the court
of appeals was not in a position to affirm a finding of a CFAA violation, but instead reinstated the
case. Id.
35
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
36
Id. at 579.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 580.
39
Id. at 579.
40
Id. at 585.
41
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see About Us,
KORN/FERRY INT’L, www.kornferry.com/AboutUs (last visited Sept. 24, 2012).
42
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
43
Id.
44
Id.
34
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confidential information outside of the firm. 45 Nosal was subsequently
charged by the government, in part for aiding and abetting his former coworkers in “exceed[ing their] authorized access” in violation of the
CFAA. 46
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. NOSAL
The government charged David Nosal with numerous counts of
trade secret theft, mail fraud, conspiracy, and criminal CFAA violations
for computer invasion. 47 Several of the CFAA violations were related to
aiding and abetting Korn/Ferry employees. 48 Nosal filed a motion to
dismiss the CFAA indictments on the theory that misuse of information
by employees with authorized access to the information was not
proscribed by the CFAA. 49 Nosal argued that the CFAA was instead
meant to prevent hackers from illegally accessing information, and did
not apply to employees who misappropriate information. 50
The district court denied Nosal’s motion to dismiss the CFAA
counts. 51 According to the district court, the Korn/Ferry employees used
the information for a fraudulent purpose, which was equivalent to
unauthorized access of information in violation of the CFAA. 52 At the
point an employee has the “intent to defraud,” the employee is no longer
authorized to access corporate information. 53 Therefore, the court
reasoned, the employee accesses the information “without authorization”
or “exceeds [his or her] authorized access.” 54
Shortly after the district court’s rejection of Nosal’s motion to
dismiss the CFAA counts, the Ninth Circuit decided a similar case that
dealt with the CFAA. 55 The case was LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,
wherein the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the CFAA’s phrases
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.” 56
The

45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
46
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outcome of Brekka caused Nosal to file a motion for reconsideration and
a second motion to dismiss. 57
The district court followed the analysis in Brekka and dismissed
most of the CFAA charges “for failure to state an offense.” 58 The
government appealed the dismissal of these CFAA charges. 59 The Court
of Appeals originally reversed and remanded the district court’s
decision, 60 but later granted rehearing en banc. 61 This Case Summary
discusses the en banc decision.
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
A. APPLICATION OF THE CFAA’S TERMS “WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION” AND “EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED ACCESS”

The Ninth Circuit explained that the CFAA was enacted to address
the issue of computer hacking. 62 The phrase in the CFAA “without
authorization” expressly prohibits access to an unauthorized computer. 63
The phrase “exceeds authorized access” is commonly applicable in the
employment context when an employee has access to a corporate
computer system but ventures outside the scope of his or her authorized
access. 64
The government agreed that the phrase “without authorization”
prohibits hackers or outsiders from unauthorized access to computers. 65
However, the government disagreed with the district court’s
interpretation of “exceeds authorized access.” 66 The government argued
that the CFAA’s phrase “exceeds authorized access” applies to persons
who are authorized to use a certain computer, but who exceed that

57

Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
Id. (referring to the district court’s opinion that “[t]here is simply no way to read [the
definition of ‘exceeds authorized access’] to incorporate corporate policies governing use of
information unless the word alter is interpreted to mean misappropriate”) (quoting United States v.
Nosal, No. C 08-0237 MHP, 2010 WL 934257, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010)).
59
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856 (noting that the district court dismissed five CFAA counts, which
were the only counts before the appellate court).
60
United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2011).
61
United States v. Nosal, 661 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2011).
62
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856-57.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 856 (“The CFAA defines ‘exceeds authorized access’ as ‘to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser
is not entitled so to obtain or alter.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)).
65
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858.
66
Id. at 856-58.
58
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authorized use. 67 In contrast, Nosal argued that “exceeds authorized
access” does not apply to the use of the information in the computer, but
strictly to access to that information. 68 According to Nosal’s argument,
an employee who has authorization to access a computer is not in
violation of the CFAA simply because he or she misuses the information
to which he or she had authorized access. 69
The court rejected the government’s argument on the basis of the
language in the CFAA: “information . . . the accesser is not entitled so to
obtain or alter.” 70 According to the court, “entitled” is synonymous with
“authorized.” 71 The government argued that “entitled” means to be
given a right, such that the Korn/Ferry employees exceeded their
authorized access when they violated the rights given to them by the
company’s use policy. 72 The government further argued that the word
“so” in this phrase is synonymous with “in that matter,” which must refer
to use restrictions. 73 The court rejected both arguments, declining to
adopt the government’s proposed broader interpretation. 74 The court
explained that the word “so” is used as a conjunction and should not be
given a substantive meaning without Congress’s express intent to expand
the scope of the CFAA by use of the word “so.” 75
According to the court, the government’s proposed broad
interpretation would result in the CFAA becoming “an expansive
misappropriation statute” instead of the “anti-hacking statute” that it is. 76
The court thus favored Nosal’s narrower interpretation of the CFAA—
the phrase “without authorization” applies to outside hackers who have
no authorized access to a computer, and “exceeds authorized access”
applies to inside hackers who have authorized access but exceed the
scope by accessing unauthorized files or data. 77

67

Id. at 856-57.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 857 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6), which provides that “the term ‘exceeds
authorized access’ means to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” (emphasis
added)).
71
Id. at 857.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 857-58.
76
Id. at 857.
77
Id. at 858.
68
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CFAA INTERPRETATION PURSUANT TO THE RULE OF
LENITY

In addressing the government’s proposed meaning of the CFAA’s
language, the Ninth Circuit explained the concept of strict construction. 78
Strict construction is encompassed in the “rule of lenity,” 79 which
requires that criminal laws be subject to a strict reading. 80 Therefore,
when two possible readings of a criminal statute are plausible, it is
necessary to select the narrower reading, unless Congress has
unambiguously prescribed the harsher alternative. 81
The rule of lenity helps guarantee that citizens will have notice of
criminal laws and their accompanying penalties. 82 The Ninth Circuit
emphasized that, should a broader interpretation of the CFAA apply, a
large number of citizens would be subject to criminal penalties for the
slightest violation of a terms of service agreement or corporate computeruse policy. 83 This could occur because it is not uncommon for an
individual to exceed his or her authorized access to a computer. 84 For
example, a member of a dating site may lie about their age when, as part
of the dating site’s policy, the member would have agreed to refrain from
posting false information. If a strict interpretation of the CFAA were
applied, the member could be charged with a CFAA violation.
If the court had accepted the government’s proposed broad
interpretation under the CFAA, employees who use company computers
to check personal email, surf the Internet for personal reasons, or shop
for personal goods could be subjected to criminal charges for a federal
offense. 85 This could lead to FBI involvement and criminal penalties for
even minor violations of corporate computer-use policies. 86 Such a
broad interpretation would encompass a much larger spectrum of
violations than Congress intended. 87 Consequently, the court determined
the language of the CFAA was not meant to include mere violations of a
corporation’s computer-use policy. 88 Rather, the CFAA’s purpose is to

78

Id.
Id.
80
Id. at 863.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 860.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
79
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prevent hackers from accessing computers that they have no
authorization to access. 89
The Ninth Circuit selected a narrower interpretation that prevents a
flood of convictions and litigations for mere “unauthorized” use of
computers, 90 holding that “exceeds authorized access” prohibits gaining
unauthorized access to information, not the unauthorized use of that
information. 91
Moreover, criminal activities and the accompanying punishment
must be clearly stated by Congress. 92 If, as is the case with the provision
involved in Nosal, there is doubt concerning congressional intent, a court
“must choose the interpretation least likely to impose penalties
unintended by Congress.” 93
The Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the CFAA’s language
“exceeds authorized access” prevented the government from having a
successful argument. 94 The determination resulted from the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of access restrictions versus use restrictions. 95 The
“exceeds authorized access” language applies to access of information,
not to use of information. 96 Therefore, the CFAA remains a prohibition
that targets hackers who unlawfully gain access to computers, instead of
a prohibition against misuse of information obtained through authorized
access to a computer. 97 Consequently, the Korn/Ferry employees and
Nosal were not subject to the CFAA’s criminal sanctions. 98
C.

COMPUTER USERS SHOULD NOT FACE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR VIOLATING COMPUTER-USE POLICIES

The Ninth Circuit provided further support for a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA by illustrating the potential consequences of a
broader interpretation. 99 The court acknowledged that employees might
frequently violate their employers’ computer-use policies, whether by
“g-chatting with friends, playing games, shopping or watching sports

89

Id. at 858.
Id. at 863.
91
Id. at 864.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 863 (quoting United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1994)).
94
Id. at 864.
95
Id. at 863-64.
96
Id. at 864.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 860-63.
90

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/10

10

Thomason: United States v. Nosal

2013]

United States v. Nosal

173

highlights.” 100 These violations, or “minor dalliances,” could be
considered federal crimes under a broad CFAA interpretation. 101
Employees who violate the CFAA under the government’s broad
interpretation could be threatened with criminal prosecution.102
Employers may take advantage of this and enforce the CFAA at their
whim, both subjectively and inconsistently. 103
Further, the government’s broad interpretation of the CFAA would
result in uncertainty as to what constitutes criminal behavior. 104
Employees, who rarely read or understand their employers’ computeruse policies, would not have sufficient notice of the criminal penalties
they could be subject to for violating the use policies. 105 The court used
the examples of not knowing whether using a company computer to
check the weather for a business trip or to check on a company softball
game would amount to a violation of the CFAA. 106 An employee may
email a friend or relative instead of calling from the company phone. 107
Under the government’s broad interpretation of the CFAA, the use of the
computer, rather than the phone, would result in criminal liability. 108
A broad interpretation of the CFAA would be problematic not only
in the employment context, but also for the public’s use of computers. 109
Internet use is often “governed by a series of private agreements and
policies that most people are only dimly aware of and virtually no one
reads or understands.” 110 These private agreements are found on popular
Internet sites such as Facebook, Amazon, IMDb, and YouTube. 111 The
Ninth Circuit provided the example of Google’s terms of service, which
forbid use of Google’s services by those who are not old enough to
“form a binding contract with Google.” 112 Another example provided by

100

Id. at 860.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 860 n.7 (noting that an employer is able to fire an employee for certain computer-use
violations that are severe enough to justify termination, such as when an employee spends “six hours
tending his FarmVille stable on his work computer”). Firing an employee is different from
enforcing criminal penalties against the employee or having him or her arrested. Id.
104
Id. at 860.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 860-61.
110
Id. at 861.
111
Id.
112
Id. (citing Google’s terms of service, effective Apr. 16, 2007-Mar. 1, 2012 § 2.3,
www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/archive/20070416 (“You may not use the Services and may
not accept the Terms if . . . you are not of legal age to form a binding contract with Google . . . .”)).
101
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the court is Facebook’s terms of service that forbid allowing another
person to log into a member’s account. 113 Other examples are posting
inaccurate information about oneself on eHarmony 114 and posting an
eBay ad in the wrong category. 115
According to the court, under the government’s proposed broad
interpretation of the CFAA, describing yourself on eHarmony as “‘tall,
dark and handsome,’ when you’re actually short and homely, will earn
you a handsome orange jumpsuit.” 116 Not only are a website’s terms of
service often difficult to find and understand, but most websites reserve
the right to revise their terms of service at any time. 117 It is unreasonable
to believe Internet users will read a website’s terms of service every time
they access a particular website. 118 Internet users, in droves, could
potentially be criminally liable for violations of various websites’ terms
of service if the government were allowed a broad interpretation of the
CFAA. 119 Therefore, the court held, the CFAA’s reference to “exceeds
authorized access” does not apply to a violation of a company’s
computer-use policy. 120
D.

THE DISSENT: KNOWLEDGE AND INTENTIONAL FRAUD
SHOULD BE WEIGHED HEAVILY WHEN APPLYING THE
CFAA

Judge Silverman wrote a dissent in which Judge Tallman joined. 121
The dissent focused on the facts specific to the case, the alleged
“valuable proprietary information” that Nosal stole from Korn/Ferry,
rather than “playing Sudoku, checking email, fibbing on dating sites, or
any of the other activities that the majority rightly values.” 122 Nosal’s
conviction stemmed from his, and his former colleagues’, intentional

113

Id. at 861 (citing Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities § 4.8
www.facebook.com/legal/terms (“You will not share your password . . . [,] let anyone else access
your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize the security of your account.”)).
114
Id. at 861 (citing eHarmony terms of service § 2(i), www.eharmony.com/about/terms
(“You will not provide inaccurate, misleading or false information to eHarmony or to any other
user.”)).
115
Id. at 861-62 (citing eBay user agreement, www.pages.ebay.com/help/policies/useragreement.html (“While using eBay sites, services and tools, you will not: post content or items in
an inappropriate category or areas on our sites and services . . . .”)).
116
Id. at 860.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 864.
122
Id.
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misuse of the company’s confidential information and knowledge that
such use violated the company’s policy. 123 According to the dissent, the
presence of fraud and knowledge set this case apart from the “far-fetched
hypotheticals” offered by the majority. 124
The dissent agreed with a recent Ninth Circuit case that interpreted
“exceeds authorized access” as going beyond the limits of an individual’s
limited allowed use of a computer. 125 If an employee has access to a
computer, but lacks access to certain files on the computer, then the
employee would exceed his or her authorized access by accessing the
restricted files. 126 As an example of this concept, the dissent explained
that a consumer may test-drive a car a short distance, but driving the car
to Mexico “on a drug run” would exceed the consumer’s authority. 127
This interpretation allows the CFAA to cover both types of theft: the
complete “unauthorized access” and the “exceed[ed] authorized
access.” 128
The dissent’s analysis falls in line with cases from the Third, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits which have held that the CFAA’s phrase “exceeds
authorized access” pertains to “employees who knowingly violate clear
company computer restrictions agreements.” 129 For example, the Fifth
Circuit case involved an employee who violated her employer’s
computer-use policy by accessing confidential customer information in
order to commit fraud. 130 The Eleventh Circuit held that a Social
Security Administration employee who accessed personal information
about former and potential girlfriends exceeded his authorized access. 131
Similarly, the Third Circuit upheld a CFAA conviction of a government
contractor’s employee who accessed confidential company information
to obtain President Obama’s student loan records. 132 The presence of
knowledge and intentional fraud justified CFAA convictions in those
cases. 133 In the dissenters’ view, Nosal’s knowledge and intent to
defraud his employer by obtaining confidential information in violation
of the employer’s policy fell squarely within the phrase “exceeds

123

Id.
Id.
125
Id. at 864-65 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir.
2009)).
126
Id. at 865.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 865-66.
130
Id. at 864 (citing United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271-73 (5th Cir. 2010)).
131
Id. at 864 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010)).
132
Id. at 861 (citing United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 2011)).
133
Id. at 866-67.
124
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authorized access” in the CFAA. 134 Therefore, the dissent would have
reversed the dismissal of the CFAA charges. 135
CONCLUSION
In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the CFAA strictly and
narrowly, limiting the scope of the CFAA’s phrase “exceeds authorized
access.” 136 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit ensured that employers would
not be able to seek harsh criminal penalties for minor breaches of
company computer-use policies. 137 At the same time, employers have
other remedies available to enforce their computer policies, such as state
criminal and civil actions. A broad interpretation of the CFAA could
affect “millions of ordinary citizens,” who might become subject to
criminal punishment for a range of common activities. 138 Other circuits
have chosen a broader interpretation of the CFAA that covers company
computer-use policy violations or violations of a duty to loyalty. 139 In
Nosal, the Ninth Circuit took the opportunity to urge the other circuits to
reconsider their interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” in the
CFAA. 140 The Ninth Circuit has laid a bright-line boundary as to what
the CFAA does and does not cover. 141 In so doing, Nosal has created a
split among the circuits that have considered the issue 142 and has invited
speculation as to whether the Supreme Court will resolve the split. 143

134

Id.
Id.
136
18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6) (Westlaw 2012).
137
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863-64.
138
Id. at 862-63.
139
Id. at 862.
140
Id. at 863.
141
Id. at 854.
142
Id. at 863.
143
See Richard Santalesa, Ninth Circuit Narrows Reach of CFAA in En Banc US v. Nosal
Decision, INFO. LAW GRP. (Apr. 13, 2012), www.infolawgroup.com/2012/04/articles/computerfraud-and-abuse-act-c/ninth-circuit-narrows-reach-of-cfaa-in-en-banc-us-v-nosal-decision.
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